Page:Southern Historical Society Papers volume 38.djvu/223

Rh Mosby tries to make it appear that General Heth's account is pure fiction; that General Lee was not on the field, and knew nothing of Hill's advance on Gettysburg.

As it was, the reconnaisance in force inaugurated by General Hill and supported by General Ewell not only removed all doubts as to the enemy's force at Gettysburg, but inflicted on them severe loss by the capture of 6,000 prisoners with five pieces of artillery, and the killing of the commander of Meade's First Army Corps, which, as General Hill says, was almost annihilated. General Lee was already concentrating his forces at Cash-town, and, encouraged by this success, decided to deliver a crushing blow while his army was elated by victory and the enemy were weakened by losses, discouraged by defeat and depressed by the death of General Reynolds. Their reinforcements hurried to their support were arriving on the field, weakened in numbers and wearied by forced marching, and had our attack been made promptly on the morning of July 2d, instead of being delayed until the afternoon of that day, the destruction of the Federal Army then on the field would have been inevitable; for at that time the Army of Northern Virginia (with the exception of Pickett's division and one brigade of Hood's division of Longstreet's corps) was concentrated before Gettysburg, elated by the success of the previous day's fighting. The delay of our attack until 4 o'clock P. M. gave the enemy twelve hours for concentration, and lost all of our advantage of numbers on the field in the morning. General Longstreet fought Federal troops in the evening, when he attacked, who were twenty-two miles from the field in the morning.

The question raised by Colonel Mosby as to whether I was present at Gettysburg, and therefore qualified or not to discuss these matters, is apart from the case. We know more now about the Battle of Waterloo than the commanders on the field, and we will know more about the Battle of Gettysburg in the future than the commanders on that field. I feel sure that in the sifting and discussion of the evidence on the movements of the forces en that historic field, it will never appear that the absence of Stuart's great cavalry force of five brigades, under its famous