Page:Southern Historical Society Papers volume 37.djvu/40

32 "This premature movement of Longstreet's and Hill's troops * * * * made the Gettysburg campaign the Illiad of the South. It set Hooker's army in motion for the Potomac the next day."

And on page 173:

"The selection (by Stuart), of the route through Hooker's army was based on the theory that the conditions would be maintained as they were until Stuart got through. The preservation of the status in Hooker's army depended on Lee. At that time the design was perfectly practicable; his army corps were separated by many miles."

And he further says on page 179:

"If Longstreet and Hill had rested one day longer in the Shenandoah Valley, Hooker would have done the same, and Stuart would not have found the roads blockaded by his (Hooker's) column, marching to the Potomac. Early on the evening of the 25th Stuart would have crossed and bivouacked for the night at Seneca."

And again on Page 192:

"If Longstreet and Hill had stayed quiet a day longer Stuart would have crossed the Potomac in advance of Hooker's army early in the evening of the 25th, and the fate of the Confederate cause might have been different. There was no pressing necessity for the movement."

General Lee did regard the movement of Longstreet and Hill as a pressing necessity, for he says in his first report: "By the 24th, the progress of Ewell rendered it necessary that the rest of the army should be in supporting distance."

From the above quotations it would appear that Col. Mosby holds General Lee responsible for the failure at Gettysburg, because he ordered Longstreet and Hill to cross the Potomac "prematurely," and thereby set Hooker's army in motion, which delayed Stuart's crossing at Seneca two days; but Stuart knew they were moving before it was too late to change the route he had selected.

The only ground upon which the advance of Longstreet and Hill could be regarded as premature is that it put the Federal