Page:Southern Historical Society Papers volume 37.djvu/141

Rh "General Lee said the attack of his right was not made as early as expected, which he should not have said. He knows that I did not believe success was possible; that care and time should be taken to give the troops the benefit of positions and the grounds; and he should have put an officer in charge who had more confidence in his plan. Two-thirds of the troops were of other commands, and there was no reason for putting the assaulting column under my charge. He had confidence in General Early, who advised in favor of that end of the line for battle. Knowing my want of confidence, he should have given the benefit of his presence and assistance in getting the troops up, posting them and arranging the batteries; but he gave no orders or suggestions after his early designation of the point for which the column should march." These post bellum utterances of Longstreet and similar expressions found in his book, accentuate the attitude displayed by him before the opening of the campaign, and throw light upon his conduct during the third day.

According to Ewell the attack on the third was to be renewed at daylight in co-operation with Longstreet.

In compliance with Ewell's orders, Johnson was about to do so, when he himself was attacked, and a vigorous effort made by the Federals to regain the works captured by General George H. Stuart the evening before.

Johnson attacking in turn pressed the enemy nearly to the top of the hill, when he was checked by abattis and other earthworks. Ewell in his report says that a half hour after Johnson attacked and when it was too late to recall him, he received notice "that Longstreet would not attack until ten o'clock," but it turned out his attack was delayed until after two o'clock.

This scarcely justified Longstreet's retort, speaking of the previous day, that "He (Ewell) was to hold himself in readiness to support an attack when it was made. It is silly to say that he was ready at sunrise, when he was not ready at four o'clock, when the attack was really made."

The countermanding of Longstreet's move to the right in the early morning, and the unexpected engagement of Johnson on the left, necessarily interrupted General Lee's plan of an early attack.