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 124 Southern Historical Socict;/ J>ti/>ers.

once." General Ewell made some impatient reply, and the conver- sation dropped.

By night (it was then about 3:30), that hill Gulp's the key of the position around Gettysburg was occupied by part of the i2th Corps, Slocums, and reinforced the next day.

On the 2nd and 3rd determined efforts were made by us to gain this hill, but without success, and fearful loss.

On our extreme right, west of Round-top Hill, General Long- street had reached a point three or four miles from Gettysburg, with but slight opposition.

That night from daylight to late at night, General Lee was anx- iously reconnoitering the ground and frequently expressed a wish to attack the enemy that night or early in the morning. Why his wish was not carried out I don't feel at liberty to explain. Nothing how- ever was done, nor a gun fired, until next day late in the afternoon.

Thus the ist and nth Corps, were signally defeated by 2:30, July ist. General Hill had lost heavily; General Rodes of Ewell's Corps had not suffered much and his men, as I saw them, were in high spirits. General Early had hardly suffered at all and General John- son had not been in the fight, only reaching the field by sundown.

What were the enemy's condition and movements?

July ist. At 3 P. M. the ist and nth Corps had been dispersed, except Steinwehr's Division of 3 or 4000 men, a reserve left on Cemetery Hill. General Hancock reached Cemetery Hill in person about 4:30, and at once advised General Meade to bring his whole army there. Slocum's i2th Corps arrived about 4:30 P. M. and was posted on the right (Federal right). Sickles with only Birney's Division, 3rd CQrps^ arrived about 5 P. M. and formed on the left of ist Corps.

These troops had all made forced marches, and were not in fight- ing order. General Wadsworth's Division took possession of Gulps Hill about sundown. The other corps i2th, Slocum's; 2nd, Han- cock's; 5th, Sykes'; 6th,Sedgewick's arrived late in the night and early on the morning of the 2nd.

It is apparent from this condition of things, at 3:30 P. M. on the ist, that the failure to follow up vigorously our success, from what- ever cause it proceeded, was the first fatal error committed. It seemed to me that General Ewell was in a position to do so. But he evidently did not feel that he should take so responsible a step with- out orders from General Lee who might reasonably be expected to take the direction of affairs at this juncture. I have since been told