Page:Southern Historical Society Papers volume 23.djvu/262

 256 Southern Historical Society Papers.

of Generals Edward Johnson and Rodes were at or near Carlisle, about thirty miles directly north of that town, while Heth's and Fen- der's and the other divisions of the army were in and about Cham- bersburg, nearly thirty miles to the westward. Thus Early and Heth were fully sixty miles apart, on an almost direct line east and west, with Gettysburg midway between, but somewhat to the south- ward. A study of the situation will make it clear to the merest tyro in logistics that if their march was the result of mere chance it was a most singular circumstance, indeed, that the four converging divi- sions Heth and Fender, from the west; Early from the east, and Rodes from the north should all arrive opportunely on the field of Gettysburg between the hours of 9 A. M. and 12 noon, in time to successfully support each other in a contest with the Union First and Eleventh corps. There can be no other conclusion than that they and the rest of the Confederate army had been moving toward one common centre, under the impulse of a single mind previously given.

But it is hardly necessary to argue the point to dispose of this question. There can be no dispute about it; it is settled by General Lee himself beyond all controversy, and it is surprising that his state- ments have been so long overlooked. In the last days of June a scout of General Longstreet's, who had passed through Washington, and subsequently the Union army, arrived at General Lee's head- quarters, in Chambersburg, with the information that Hooker's en- tire force had crossed the Potomac, and was moving northward, imperilling the Confederate communications with the South. This made necessary the immediate drawing in of the widely-sundered Confederate divisions.

CHANGED HIS MIND.

It is evident, on receiving this disturbing information that General Lee's first impulse was to bring Ewell back and concentrate at Cham- bersburg, west of the mountains, but, after studying the situation twelve hours, and, perhaps, upon better information, he changed his mind, and concluded to cross to the east side of the South mountain range and take position at Gettysburg a strategic position of great importance because of the many excellent turnpike roads which radiate therefrom. At Gettysburg he would not only occupy an ex- cellent position from which to fall back toward the Potomac, if found necessary to deliver or receive battle; one safely covering his line of communications, but one threatening both Washington and Balti-