Page:Southern Historical Society Papers volume 23.djvu/255

 General Meade' s Temper. L'l 1 .'

This surprising characteristic in so irritable and passionate a man had two remarkable illustrations during General Lee's mystifying Mank movement from the Rapiilan toward Washington in the fall of 1863. General Meade, finding the Confederates on his right flank, and threatening his communications with Washington, fell back rapidly from the line of the Rapidan, first to the Rappahannock, and ultimately behind Bull Run, concentrating his army in the vicinity of Centreville. It was then well known that General Lee had recently detached Longstreet to the assistance of Bragg at Chat- tanooga, and that consequently he was still probably inferior in stu-ngth to the Union army, although that also had been reduced by two corps, sent to reinforce Rosecrans, after the Battle of Chicka- mauga. The Washington authorities, therefore, correctly viewed General Lee's advance as a big " bluff," which ought to be " called," and constantly urged General Meade to make a stand and fight.

LINCOLN'S NOTE.

In a short note to General Halleck, the Federal general-in-chief, dated October 16, 1863, President Lincoln, touching upon the situa- tion as he understood it, and pointing out the probability of General Lee's inferiority of numbers, closes with the following eminently Lincolnian suggestion:

no more than equal for us, and do so with all the skill and courage which he, his officers, and men possess, the honor will be his if he succeeds, and the blame may be mine if he fails.
 * * * If General Meade can now attack him (Lee) on a field

Yours truly, A. LINCOLN.

In deep anxiety to impress General Meade with the importance of immediately attacking General Lee, the President's letter was trans- mitted by Halleck to the front by special messenger, Colonel Cutts, of his staff. As the President and his military advisers at Washing- ton could have had but little accurate knowledge of what was passing with great rapidity from hour to hour at the front, and hence were in a measure incapable of judging of the chances of success in a col- lision; and, therefore, declined to assume the responsibility of making a direct order for an attack, this urgency on the part of his superiors must have been excessively exasperating to the Union commander, the more so because it was his distinct purpose to deliver battle upon the first favorable opportunity. But General Lee had projected his movement so unexpectedly and prosecuted it with such energy and