Page:Southern Historical Society Papers volume 14.djvu/364

 358 Sonthern Historical Society Papers.

our original camp-ground about 3 or 4 o'clock, and took up the line of march for the battlefield, on the extreme left, hearing from time to time, as we proceeded, reports of the heavy pressure and fearful carnage upon our left. We arrived on the ground after sun- set, when the enemy were hastening, not slowly, "on to" — Wash- ington, and the hills reverberating with the shouts of victory. We had scarcely halted, when, in consequence of a report that the enemy were flanking us by way of Union Mills, our two companies of cavalry were ordered to hasten back to that point, each trooper yfi\\.h din infafit en croupe. But I imagine there was not a Yankee this side the Potomac who would not have been amused (or scared) at the idea of his crossing Bull Run at that crisis.

In the month of October, circumstances led to my resignation and return home. Before I left, General Ewell sent for me to his quarters. "Captain," said he, handing me some papers, " I learn that some of the newspapers in the far South are imputing responsibility to me for the failure of our army to make the attack at Manassas as con- templated. Now, of course, I can publish nothing at this time. But you are going home, through Richmond, and may, sooner or later, hear the subject discussed. Have an accurate copy made of this correspondence between General Beauregard and myself, and take it with you, that you may have it in your power to vindicate me." I promptly complied with his request, and preserved the paper. It was verbatim et literatim as now published in the Southern His- torical Society Papers. After the war a published call was made by the Society for all such matter, and I sent this copy of the correspondence to the person indicated as the appointed recipient, possibly the present secretary.

In the light of what did happen, I suppose I am not singular in saying, that I never think of the mysterious failure of these orders to three brigades to reach them, followed by the one countermanding Eweirs advance, without a thrill in every nerve —

1. Had they been duly delivered, of course the whole battle of Manassas must have been fought on the east side of Bull Run — that stream in our rear. Would the panic and rout have been more or less, or equally likely to have resulted ? If they had, what would have been \\\^ finale.^ If not, ditto? But —

2. Given the failures, had General Ewell not been recalled when that panic-stricken army rolled back upon itself, what would have been the effect of five thousand fresh troops attacking it in flank and rear ? And may not one venture to ask, why should not that have