Page:Southern Historical Society Papers volume 14.djvu/123

 First Maryland Campaign. 117

mass of artillery in good position, the country extending all the way to the Potomac, and Jackson reluctantly concluded that the mpve- ment was impracticable with the forces he had at hand. Thus, while McClellan and his lieutenants were husbanding a fresh corps of 12,000 men because the 40,000 men who had been engaged on the Federal right were deemed incapable of even holding their own lines in case of a counter attack, Lee and his subordinates were planning such a counter attack to be made, not by fresh troops, but by regiments every one of which had been engaged in the morning struggle.

Note another fact : General Lee held his position all next day, and no attempt was made upon it by the Federal army. McClellan was unwilling to risk further battle without reinforcements, and these wefe on their way to him. Lee, on the other hand, offered battle all day on the 1 8th. He was ready and willing to meet the army he had re- pulsed on the 17th. But he could expect no reinforcements to offset those which were about to join McClellan, and he, therefore, with- drew his forces across the Potomac on the night of the i8th. It seems to me very clear that there were no 10,000 soldiers in McClel- lan' s army (and he had more than that number of fresh troops) who could have overwhelmed Lee. The truth of the matter is that the Confederate army was better off at the close of Sharpsburg than the Federal army, and it is far more likely that Jackson with " 10,000 fresh men " would have driven, the latter into the Antietam than have been driven from his own position. It is certain at any rate that Lee and Jackson and Sumner and McClellan thought so, and their views may be taken as a fair offset to General Longstreet's.

When General Lee undertook the reduction of Harper's Ferry, he expected to accomplish it and to reunite his army in the Hagerstown Valley before having to deal with McClellan. We have seen that this expectation was justified by the condition of the Federal army, by McClellan's character as a commander, and by the sensitiveness of the Federal Government in regard to Washington. This expec-

tation was defeated by the loss of the dispatch containing General Lee's plans, and, we believe, by this alone. General Longstreet seems to think that only Virginian writers consider this dispatch of great importance. We believe that Generals Longstreet and D. H. Hill are the only two people who refuse to see the decisive import- ance of the lost dispatch upon the campaign. (See Swinton, Comte de Paris, Palfrey, &c.) General Lee, we know, thought it the most important factor in the campaign. It changed all his plans and, as he believed, the result. A single day of delay on McClellan's part