Page:Southern Historical Society Papers volume 14.djvu/117

 First Maryland Campaign. Ill

to escape into Maryland, but McLaws, no doubt, thought his troops on Maryland Heights sufificiently blocked the road at its base, and the consequence was the escape of the Federal cavalry.

The operations of Harper's Ferry were under Jackson's control as the senior officer. There was, we believe, no disposition on the part of the Virginia papers, nor of anyone else, to make Jackson the "hero of Harper's Ferry" to the disparagement of any of his col- leagues, but it probably never occurred to any one but General Longstreet that Jackson's was not the leading part in this brilliant operation. All honor to General McLaws for what he did, but his was not the " severer and more important service." Creditable as was the part he played, it has no claim either from its intrinsic import- ance, or from the manner in which he discharged the duties assigned him, to be classed with Jackson's achievements on the same occa- sion.

Though McClellan, after the capture of the lost dispatch, was no longer perplexed as to his adversary's designs, but was free to devote all of his energies to the relief of Harper's Ferry and the crushing of that part of the Confederate army which was nearest to him be- fore the other portion could rejoin it, the habitual caution and slow- ness of the Federal commander prevented him from reaping the full advantage of his good fortune. As we have seen, Lee was able to hold him back at the South Mountain passes until nightfall on the 14th of September, and the time thus gained was sufficient to insure the fall of Harper's Ferry early next morning. This disaster to the Federal army was known to McClellan as soon as it was to Lee, and thenceforward the former's only object must have been to exact as severe a penalty as possible from his adversary for this success. When Lee took position behind the Antietam, on September 15th, he had but Longstreet and D. H. Hill with him, and as this fact was known to McClellan, it is difficult to account for the deliberation of his movements. Lee, it is true, disposed of his troops and batter- ies so as to show as formidable a front as possible Imposed upon to some extent by this, and slow at best, McClellan not only did not attack on the afternoon of the 15th, but was not ready to do so until nightfall of the i6th. It was Wednesday morning, the 17th of Sep- tember, before the Federal commander was able to deliver battle. Lee used every hour of his time in energetic efforts to re-unite his army. The troops about Harper's Ferry were recalled to Sharps- burg by orders suitable to the urgency of the occasion. Jackson, leaving A. P. Hill's division, marched back on the evening and night