Page:Southern Historical Society Papers volume 13.djvu/43

 42 Southern Historical Society Papers.

moved in a direction opposite to his technical orders when facts plainly showed him the service he ought to perform, whence the glorious result of Marengo, or help believing that if Jackson had been there, the movement would not have balked."

The officer referred to is the late Lieutenant-General R. S. Ewell, and the censure is based on the following statement on page 95:

"Meanwhile, in rear of Mitchell's Ford, I had been waiting with General Johnston for the sound of conflict to open in the quarter of Centreville upon the Federal left flank and rear (making allowance, however, for the delays possible to commands unused to battle), when I was chagrined to hear from General D. R. Jones that, while he had been long ready for the movement upon Centreville, General Ewell had not come up to form on his right, though he had sent him between seven and eight o'clock a copy of his own order, which re- cited that Ewell had been already ordered to begin the mov'ement. I dispatched an immediate order to Ewell to advance, but within a quarter of an hour, just as I received a dispatch from him informing me that he had received no order to advance in the morning, the firing on the left began to increase so intensely as to indicate a severe attack, whereupon General Johnston said that he would go person- ally to that quarter."

These two short extracts contain at least three errors, so serious that they should not be allowed to pass uncorrected among the ma- terials from which history will one day be constructed :

1. That Ewell failed to do what a good soldier of the type of Desaix or Stonewall Jackson would have done, namely, to move forward immediately on hearing from D. R. Jones.

2. That Beauregard was made aware of this supposed backward- ness of Ewell by a message from D. R. Jones.

3. That on receiving this message he at once ordered Ewell to advance.

The subjoined correspondence, now first in print, took place four days after the battle. It shows that Ewell did exactly what Beaure- gard says he ought to have done, namely: move forward promptly; that his own staff-officer, sent to report this forward movement, carried also to headquarters the first intelligence of the failure of orders to reach him ; that no such message was received from D. R. Jones as is here ascribed to him; and that the order sent back by