Page:Southern Historical Society Papers volume 08.djvu/367

Rh As the statements of Generals Hardee and Hood seem thus to conflict, they must be respectively tested by comparison with such pertinent facts as appear in the text, or are otherwise established.

One such fact is that McPherson's general position, on the Decatur side of Atlanta, was well known and defined. His pressure there, as we have seen, had been such as to necessitate the shifting of Cheatham's corps, and the exigent call for Cleburne's division as early as the 20th July, and our forces had been resisting him all along that line throughout the day on the 21st. He was now entrenched along a north and south line, facing westward, with his extreme entrenched left (the left of Blair's corps) resting at a point some three miles southeast of Atlanta and some five miles southwest of Decatur. Two plans of operations seem to have been discussed—one, by a sufficient detour, to strike and turn this left flank; the other, by a movement to and through Decatur and back on the rear of the enemy, which would have brought the attacking force in rear of McPherson's centre or right flank. The distances and positions involved necessarily made these distinct and independent plans; and it would seem most extraordinary that a force should have been sent out from Atlanta in the night, and through a country so densely wooded as to be impracticable for marching off the roadways, and by such a detour, as is indicated by the order to cross "Entrenchment creek and Cobb's mill" (see map, 167), with a roving commission, either to turn and attack this flank, located as described, or to move to or beyond Decatur, and thence back on the rear of the enemy, especially when the alleged discretionary instruction, involving a difference of many hours in execution, is coupled with the definite expectation of attack at daylight or soon thereafter.

And the result vindicated the wisdom of the plan adopted as compared with the Decatur plan; for, as it was, Hardee's movement by Cobb's mill, and thence northeastwardly towards Decatur to the proper point, and thence through dense woods upon McPherson's left rear, was a surprise; whereas a detour by way of Decatur, and the collision with the brigade (Sprague's) there posted, would have given the enemy timely and invaluable notice of the movement. General Wheeler says it was explained in the council held by General Hood "that the object in going so far south as Cobb's mill was to secrete the movement from the enemy." This object would have been wholly defeated by Hardee's march to Decatur and the consequent collision with the detachment there.