Page:Southern Historical Society Papers volume 07.djvu/439

Rh to protect his rear and baggage. General Meade also complains that his movements were delayed by the detention of his cavalry in his rear; he might truthfully have added, by the movement in his rear of a large force of Confederate cavalry, capturing his trains and cutting all his communications with Washington.

It is not to be supposed such delay in his operations could have been so effectually caused by any other disposition of the cavalry. Moreover, considering York as the point of junction, as I had every reason to believe it would be, the route I took was quite as direct and more expeditious than the alternate one proposed; and there is reason to believe on that route that my command would have been divided up in the different gaps of South mountain, covering our flank, while the enemy, by concentration upon any one, could have greatly endangered our baggage and ordnance trains, without exposing his own.

It was thought by many that my command could have rendered more service had it been in advance of the army the first day at Gettysburg, and the Commanding-General complains of a want of cavalry on the occasion; but it must be remembered that the cavalry (Jenkins' brigade) specially selected for advance guard to the army by the Commanding-General, on account of its geographical location at the time, was available for this purpose, and had two batteries of horse artillery serving with it. If, therefore, the peculiar functions of cavalry with the army were not satisfactorily performed in the absence of my command, it should rather be attributed to the fact that Jenkins' brigade was not as efficient as it ought to have been, and as its numbers (3,800) on leaving Virginia warranted us in expecting. Even at that time by its reduction incident to the campaign, it numbered far more than the cavalry which successfully covered Jackson's flank movement at Chancellorsville, turned back Stoneman from the James, and drove 3,500 cavalry under Averill across the Rappahannock.

Properly handled, such a command should have done everything requisite, and left nothing to detract, by the remotest implication, from the brilliant exploits of their comrades, achieved under circumstances of great hardship and danger.

Arriving at York, I found that General Early had gone, and it is to be regretted that this officer failed to take any measure, by leaving an intelligent scout to watch for my coming, or a patrol to meet me to acquaint me with his destination. He had reason to expect me, and had been directed to look out for me. He heard