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Rh the view to entrap me upon my entrance into the town. They were frustrated in their intention, and although very peaceable in external aspect, I soon found the information I had received was correct. I disliked to subject the town to the consequences of attack; at the same time it was essential to us to procure rations. I, therefore, directed General Lee to send in a flag of truce, demanding unconditional surrender or bombardment. This was refused. I placed artillery in position commanding the town, took possession of the main avenues to the place, and repeated the demand. It was again refused, and I was forced to the alternative of shelling the place. Although the houses were used by their sharpshooters while firing on our men, not a building was fired except the United States cavalry barracks, which were burnt by my order; the place having resisted my advance instead of peaceable surrender, as in the case of General Ewell. General Fitz. Lee's brigade was charged with the duty of investing the place—the remaining brigades following at considerable intervals from Dover. Major-General W. F. Smith was in command of the force in Carlisle. The only obstacle to the enforcement of my threat was the scarcity of artillery ammunition. The whereabouts of our army was still a mystery; but during the night I received a dispatch from General Lee in answer to one sent by Major Venable from Dover, on Early's trail, that the army was at Gettysburg, and had been engaged on this day (1st July) with the enemy's advance. I instantly dispatched to Hampton to move ten miles that night on the road to Gettysburg, and gave orders to the other brigades with a view to reaching Gettysburg early next day, and started myself that night.

My advance reached Gettysburg July 2d, just in time to thwart a move of the enemy's cavalry upon our rear, by way of Hunterstown; after a fierce engagement, in which Hampton's brigade performed gallant service, a series of charges compelling the enemy to leave the field, and abandon his purpose. I took my position that day on the York and Heidelburg roads, on the left wing of the. Army of Northern Virginia.

On the morning of the 3d of July, pursuant to instructions from the Commanding-General (the ground along our line of battle being totally impracticable for cavalry operations), I moved forward to a position to the left of General Ewell's left, and in advance of it, where a commanding ridge completely controlled a wide plain of cultivated fields stretching towards Hanover on the left, and reaching to the base of the mountain spurs among which the