Page:Southern Historical Society Papers volume 07.djvu/21

Rh in earnest. General J. E. Johnston had transferred the mass of his army to the front of Richmond, and had taken command there in person. Ewell's division alone remained on the Rappahannock, to watch the enemy there, and to aid Jackson in case of need. This division was now near Gordonsville, and a good road from that point through Swift Run Gap placed it within easy reach of Jackson.

The latter, conscious of his inability with five or six thousand men (his force had nearly doubled since Kernstown by the return of furloughed men and by new enlistments) to resist in the open country the advance of Banks, had availed himself of the nature of the country to take a position where he could be attacked only at great disadvantage, and yet might threaten the flank and rear of the advancing column, if it attempted to pass him. The main Shenandoah river covered his front, a stream not easily fordable at any time, and now swollen by the spring rains. The spurs of the mountains as they run out towards this river afford almost impregnable positions for defence; his flank could only be turned by toilsome and exposed marches, while good roads led from his rear to General Ewell. Thus secure in his position, Jackson at the same time more effectually prevented the further advance of the Federal column than if he had remained in its front; for he held the bridge over the Shenandoah, and was but a day's march from Harrisonburg, and should Banks threaten to move forward towards Staunton, he was ready to hurl the Confederate forces against his enemy's flank and rear. General Banks at Harrisonburg was in the midst of a hostile country, and already one hundred miles from the Potomac at Harper's Ferry, with which a long line of wagon communication had to be maintained. To push on to Staunton, with Jackson on his flank and rear, was virtually to sacrifice his present line of communication, with no practicable substitute in view; to attack the Confederates on the slopes of the mountains, with even a greatly superior force, was to risk defeat.

On the 28th of April Jackson applied to General Lee, then acting as Commander-in-Chief under President Davis, for a reinforcement of five thousand men, which addition to his force he deemed necessary to justify him in marching out and attacking Banks.

Next day he was informed that no troops could be spared to him beyond the commands of Ewell and of Edward Johnson, the latter 'of whom was seven miles west of Staunton, at West View, with a brigade.