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Geary's division was removed very early in the morning, and Sickles' corps remained on that flank, alone, until late in the afternoon. It was in the morning that he reported to Meade his apprehension of an attack on that flank, as shown by Meade's testimony, and yet no arrangements were made for transferring troops to meet such an attack, and Sickles did not go into position until near 4 o'clock. In fact Meade had been projecting an attack from his right flank on our left until the afternoon, when it was reported impracticable. He then ordered the Fifth corps (Sykes') over to the left about 2 o'clock P. M. In his testimony he says:

General Warren, after saying he had reconnoitred in front of their right and advised against an attack there, adds:

He then says that he went to Round Top, by Meade's direction, and from there sent word to Meade that that point would have to be occupied very strongly. Meade then ordered a division of Sykes' corps, which was coming up, to the position, and Warren says:

The assumption, under these circumstances, that, "had the attack been made earlier or later, we should have seen the Federals move just as they did, and with the same results," argues a degree of obtuseness on the part of the writer of the above passage, or of reliance upon the credulity of his readers, which is marvellous. The idea is, that, if Longstreet's columns had gone to the attack at sunrise, or at any time in the morning, when Meade apprehended no attack in that quarter, and Round Top was not occupied and he knew nothing of the character of the ground, he would have been able to make precisely the same dispositions before the enemy was reached by Longstreet's