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Rh corps (Sickles) were the next troops to arrive; they came up about sunset, less one brigade left at Emmettsburg, and numbered, at that hour, 4,500.

Humphrey's division of that corps did not reach the field until towards midnight—(General Humphreys, in a letter to me). It will be noticed, however, that General Hancock says that portions of the Second and Third corps, had our assault been sudden or the contest brief, would not have been available until dark. If these figures are correct, I am authorized in reaffirming that "a little more marching, perhaps a little more fighting," would have gained for us the possession of the heights on the evening of the 1st of July.

On the other hand, General Early, in a masterly review of those operations in the December number Southern Historical Society Papers, 1877, gives some strong reasons, which at the time prevented a further advance, made more convincing by the fact of its being well known that he desired to move on after the retreating Federals. I can well imagine that, with the existing doubt as to what portion of the Federal army was then within supporting distance of the First and Eleventh corps, the arrival at a most inopportune moment of what proved to be a false report, that the enemy were advancing on the York road, which would have brought them in the rear of the Confederate troops; the time consumed in investigating the report; the apparent strength of the enemy's position; would all combine to make a subordinate commander hesitate to take the responsibility of beginning another battle; more especially as his chief was close at hand. I know, too, how easy it is, in the light of subsequent events, to criticise an officer's action. "Young man, why did you not tell me that before the battle"? General Lee is reported to have said to an officer who was commenting upon some of the movements at Gettysburg, "even as stupid a man as I am can see it all now," illustrates the point.

Being at the commencement of the war Ewell's chief-of-staff, knowing his soldierly qualities, and loving his memory, God forbid that I should utter one word to detract from the splendid record he has left behind him. His corps being more advanced than Hill's after the action was over, and he being the senior officer present, has caused his conduct on the first, in not pursuing the enemy, to