Page:Southern Historical Society Papers volume 04.djvu/90

82 the resisting powers of the South," is plausible enough, since we lacked success at Gettysburg; but had we accomplished as much as was reasonably hoped for, how different it would have been! Looking to the pecuniary exhaustion of the North, spoken of by ———, a decided success for the Confederates in Pennsylvania would have exerted a powerful influence on the Federal finances. Then, again, even as matters resulted, so far from diminishing the resisting powers of the South for one or two years, it freed Virginia of the presence of Federals for a time and threw them back one year.

General Grant found the Army of the Potomac in May, 1864, pretty much where it was in the spring of the previous year.

The design of General Lee in invading the Northern States was to free Virginia of the presence of the enemy—to transfer the theatre of war to the enemy's country, and to take the reasonable chance of defeating his adversary there—knowing full well that to obtain an advantage there over the enemy would operate more powerfully in our favor than to discomfit him in Virginia.

He sought an encounter with his opponent, but upon his own terms as to time and place. He justly felt great confidence in his army, and hoped to select a favorable position, where he could receive the attack which the enemy would be compelled to make, and from which, if successful, he could seriously threaten the Federal capital. The condition of the army at this time was excellent; never was I so impressed by its morale as when the two corps of Hill and Longstreet passed through Chambersburg.

Now, as to the battle itself. The first great disadvantage experienced by General Lee was the unexpected absence of his cavalry. Certain discretionary power had to be left with General Stuart as to where he would cross the Potomac. It was arranged that the movements of the enemy and his own judgment should determine this, but he was to connect at once with General Lee, keep on his flank, and advise him of the enemy's movements. After crossing