Page:Southern Historical Society Papers volume 04.djvu/67

Rh and hear what they have undertaken to record; and you can readily understand that, in the dreadful shock of battle, men have not the leisure or the calmness to frame pretty speeches, nor are they exactly in the condition to recollect what any of their comrades may have given utterance to. I am as incredulous about dramatic speeches and ejaculations in time of battle as about "real bayonet charges."

Our failure to carry the position at Gettysburg was not due so much to the superior fighting of Meade's army in position as to the failure to support, according to General Lee's instruction, the several attacks made on the 2d and 3d, and the delay in making those attacks. Meade did not select the position at Gettysburg; but that position was forced on him by the engagement which took place unexpectedly on the 1st. He had previously selected another position, behind Pipe creek, for his battle-ground, and even on the 2d, after his arrival at Gettysburg, deliberated about withdrawing to the former position, and was probably prevented from doing so by the attack on our part. See the testimony of himself and others before the Congressional Committee on the Conduct of the War, contained in the 1st vol. (2d series) of its report.

Your third proposition, that "the way in which the fights of the 2d of July were directed does not show the same co-ordination which ensured the success of the Southern arms at Gaines' Mill and Chancellorsville"—in which I understand you to mean by "co-ordination," co-operation and concert of action—has more of soundness in it. In the first place, it was intended by General Lee that the attack from his right flank on the enemy's left should commence at a very early hour on the morning of the 2d; that Hill should threaten the center with two of his divisions, and cooperate in Longstreet's attack with his right division; while Ewell was to make a demonstration upon the enemy's right, to be converted into a real attack should opportunity offer—that is, should success attend the attack on the enemy's left. That attack was not