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278 should be heard on the left. The reason for this was that Johnson confronted a wooded hill, and had to feel his way through the woods with skirmishers to find the enemy, while the ground over which Rodes and myself had to move was open, and there was no need of skirmishers, but when we started we could go right on. My two brigades started promptly at the sound of Johnson's muskets, moved over the space intervening between them and the base of Cemetery Hill, fought their way up the face of that hill, over stone fences or walls held by successive lines of infantry, and got into the works on the top of the hill while Johnson was yet fighting on the slopes of Culp's Hill. There was, then, no work by "piece-meal," so far as Johnson and myself were concerned, nor is the remark that Ewell's divisions were not made to act in concert applicable to us. Colonel Allan should have recollected that he was writing for the use of one engaged in writing a history of that battle, and not made his charge of want of concert so broad. I believe that if Rodes had advanced at the time designated, especially if one of Hill's divisions on his right had co-operated, we would then have gained permanent possession of that hill; but I am not willing to submit to the imputation of a want of concert or co-operation so far as I am concerned, and I insist that the proper discrimination should be made.

The assertion that "Early was beaten back before Rodes was ready to support him" is a mode of characterizing that brilliant charge by my two brigades that does them great injustice. Prof. Bates' description of that charge contains some of the finest writing in his book, and is very graphic, as well as correct in its main features, though he over-estimates very greatly the numbers contained in my two brigades, especially Hays', as well as the loss sustained by them.

Colonel Taylor gives General Rodes' explanation of his failure to advance as follows: