Page:Southern Historical Society Papers volume 04.djvu/118

110 "ri pooteriposte [sic]," and that it was that apprehension which brought him alone out to my guns where he could observe all the indications.

In the above narrative I have given all the light I can throw the subjects of enquiry in the 4th and 5th questions of 's letter, the 1st and 2d having been previously discussed. The 3d question relates to the lack of co-ordination between the attacks of the 2d July; and a similar lack of co-ordination is equally patent in the attacks on the 3d. I attribute it partially to the fact that our staff organizations were never sufficiently extensive and perfect to enable the Commanding-General to be practically present every where and to thoroughly handle a large force on an extended field, but principally it was due to the exceedingly difficult shape in which our line was formed, the enemy occupying a center and we a semi-circumference, with poor and exposed communications along it. I believe it was simply impossible to have made different attacks from the flanks and center of the line we occupied and over the different distances which would have to be traversed and which should be so simultaneous that the squeeze would fall on the enemy at all points at the same time. And in this connection, I think that the very position which we took and every feature of the three days' conflict shows the absurdity of a story told by Swinton, who is generally very fair and above giving anecdotes suitable only for the marines. He says that some of our brigades were encouraged to the charge by being told that they were to meet only Pennsylvania militia, but on getting very near the enemy's line they "recognized the bronzed features of the veterans of the Army of the Potomac," (I quote from