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280 General Grant, meanwhile, in his eagerness for the coveted prize so long denied him, resolved to tempt Fortune by a double throw, and not to stake his all upon the venture of a single cast. To this end, he dispatched, on the evening of the 26th, Hancock's corps and two divisions of horse under Sheridan to the north side of the James, with instructions to the former to move up rapidly next day to Chaffin's and prevent reinforcements crossing from the south, while Sheridan, making a wide sweep to the right, was to attempt from the north a surprise of the thinly-garrisoned fortifications of Richmond. Meade was to spring the mine and assault from Burnside's front on the same day, General Grant stating in the telegraphic order, with

"Your two remaining corps, with the Eighteenth, make you relatively stronger against the enemy at Petersburg than we have been since the first day." But the cautious Meade replied that he could not advise an assault in the absence of the Second corps, while the rough treatment experienced by Sheridan indicated that the Confederate capital was secure against surprise.

But although the movement north of the James was not, as commonly represented, a skilful feint which deceived Lee, but a real attempt to surprise Richmond, which he thwarted by concentrating heavily on his left, yet to parry the stroke the Confederate commander had been compelled so to denude the Petersburg front that there was left for its defence but four brigades of Bushrod Johnson's division and the divisions of Hoke and Mahone, which together with the artillery made up a force of little over 13,000 effective men.

The conjuncture was still bright with success to the Federals, and it being now decided to spring the mine before daylight of the 30th, Hancock's movement was treated as a feint, and that officer