Page:Southern Historical Society Papers volume 02.djvu/276

266 But not a man of the Army of the Potomac had as yet crossed, and the conjuncture being now so nice that the slightest blunder would have been attended with irreparable disaster, he drew back his troops towards Chaffin's, dispatched Hoke early on the 15th from Drewry's Bluff to reinforce Beauregard, and stood ready to repel direct advance by the river routes or to throw his army into Petersburg, as events might dictate.

Grant's design, as we now know, was to

and it had certainly succeeded but for an incredible negligence on his own part.

Smith's command reached Bermuda Hundred, where Grant was in person, on the evening of the 14th, and being reinforced by Kautz's Division of Cavalry and Hink's Division of Negro Infantry, was at once directed to cross the Appomattox at Point of Rocks, where pontons had been laid, and move rapidly on Petersburg. The passage of the river was effected during the same night, and early on the 15th, Smith advanced in three columns, Kautz with his horsemen covering his left. Now Hancock's entire corps had been ferried to the south side on the night of Smith's arrival at Bermuda Hundred, and might easily have been pushed forward to take part in the assault, but, left in ignorance of the projected coup-de-main, its commander, in obedience to orders, was awaiting rations where he had crossed. Incredible as it may seem, General Meade, the immediate commander of the Army of the Potomac, was left in like ignorance, and General Grant, hurrying back to the north side to push forward reinforcements from the corps of Wright and Burnside, found that the army ponton-train had been sent to piece out the wagon-train pontons, which had proved insufficient for the passage of the Chickahominy at Coles' ferry. Thus nearly a day was gained to the handful of brave men defending the lines of Petersburg, and lost to the Army of the Potomac—a curious instance of the uncertain contingencies of war, reminding the military student, with a difference, of the happy chance which saved Zaragoza in the first siege, when Lefebre Desnouettes, "missing the road to the bridge, missed that to victory."

Smith, pushing forward his columns towards Petersburg early on the morning of the 15th, had scarcely advanced a distance of two