Page:Southern Historical Society Papers volume 02.djvu/22

12 troops which were sent to reinforce the armies in the field—some of the hundred days' men being sent to the front at their own request. In order, then, to substantiate his assertion that Grant's force for duty in the field at the Wilderness was only 98,000 men, General Badeau must show that Mr. Stanton has lied in the most willful and stupid manner, and without the slightest inducement to do so. His statement not only has this effect, but it also convicts General Grant himself of very gross blundering. The latter states in the outset of his report, which has already been quoted from, the strategic principles upon which he proposed to conduct the war, after the command of all the United States armies had devolved upon him, and says:

"From the first, I was firm in the conviction that no peace could be had that would be stable and conducive to the happiness of the people, both North and South, until the military power of the rebellion was broken. I therefore determined, first, to use the greatest number of troops practicable against the armed force of the enemy, preventing him from using the same force at different seasons against first one and then another of our armies, and the possibility of repose for refitting and producing necessary supplies for carrying on resistance. Second, to hammer continuously against the armed force of the enemy and his resources, until by mere attrition, if in no other way, there should be nothing left to him but an equal submission with the loyal section of our common country to the constitution and laws of the land.

"These views have been kept constantly in mind, and orders given and campaigns made to carry them out."

Yet, notwithstanding these views and purposes, and despite the preparations on such a grand scale for the campaign of 1864, as described by Mr. Stanton, with evident feelings of pride, on page 3 of his report, General Grant, according to General Badeau's statement, out of an aggregate force of 662,345 available men for duty, could only muster 98,000 to confront the most formidable army of his antagonist—that is, when the United States forces were larger than they had ever been before, Grant opened the campaign in Virginia with a smaller army than any other Federal commander in that State, since the First Battle of Manassas, had ever before entered the field with, and that, too, according to General Badeau's estimate, against a larger army than General Lee had ever before commanded in an active campaign, except, perhaps, during the Seven Days' Battles around Richmond. General Badeau's recollections of the "Confidential field returns," mentioned by him, is evidently