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 copyrights, and granted summary judgment to Sohm. Id. at *14.

The parties settled the remaining claims, which were scheduled for trial, but they reserved their rights to appeal aspects of the district court’s summary judgment rulings.

On appeal and cross-appeal, Sohm and Scholastic each raise three challenges to the district court’s summary judgment. Sohm contends that the district court erred by (1) “finding, with respect to images Scholastic obtained from Corbis, that Sohm can sue only for breach of contract and not copyright infringement” because the print-run limitations were conditions precedent, not contractual covenants, Sohm’s Br. at 15; (2) shifting the burden of proof to Sohm to demonstrate that Scholastic exceeded the scope of its license; and (3) incorrectly dismissing “Sohm’s claim corresponding to Row 4 of Exhibit 5 to the First Amended Complaint,” id. at 36–37. Scholastic maintains that the district court erred when it (1) applied the “discovery rule,” not the “injury rule,” to determine when Sohm’s claims accrued for statute of limitations purposes, Scholastic’s Br. at 33–35; (2) allowed damages for more than three years prior to when the copyright infringement suit was filed; and (3) determined that Corbis’s group registrations, which did not indicate that Sohm or Visions of America was the author of any included photographs, were valid under the Copyright Act for Sohm’s individual photographs.

“We review de novo the [d]istrict [c]ourt’s partial grant and partial denial of summary judgment.” Psihoyos, 784 F.3d at 123.

Sohm alleged that Scholastic committed copyright infringement by exceeding the print-run limitations contained in the license documents. The district court, however, found that the license provisions were contractual covenants, and thus that his claims sounded only in breach of contract. Sohm maintains that the court “erred in its condition / covenant analysis, ignoring clear language of condition in the [license] documents.” Sohm’s Br. at 13. He contends that the district court misconstrued unmistakable language of conditions precedent, and therefore that he properly brought claims sounding in copyright infringement, not breach of contract. We agree.

“Generally, ‘if the licensee’s improper conduct constitutes a breach of a covenant undertaken by the licensee and if such covenant constitutes an enforceable contractual obligation, then the licensor will have a cause of action for breach of contract,’ not copyright infringement.” Graham v. James, 144 F.3d 229, 236 (2d Cir. 1998) (brackets and alteration omitted) (quoting 3 Melville B. Nimmer & David Nimmer, Nimmer on Copyright § 10.15[A]). “However, ‘if the nature of a licensee’s violation consists of a failure to satisfy a condition to the license, it follows that the rights dependent upon satisfaction of such condition have not been effectively licensed, and therefore, any use by the licensee is without authority from the licensor and may therefore, constitute an infringement of copyright.’ ” Id. at 237 (brackets and alteration omitted) (quoting 3 Nimmer on Copyright § 10.15[A] ).

Under New York law, a covenant is “a manifestation of intention to act or