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 prior to filing the action].”), with Energy Intelligence Grp. Inc. v. Scotia Capital (USA) Inc., 16-cv-617, 2017 WL 432805, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 30, 2017) (“[U]nder no reasonable reading of Petrella could the opinion be interpreted to establish a time limit on the recovery of damages separate and apart from the statute of limitations.”). Agreeing with the former decisions, we determine that Petrella’s plain language explicitly dissociated the Copyright Act’s statute of limitations from its time limit on damages.

In Petrella, the Supreme Court initiated its examination of the Copyright Act’s statute of limitations by explaining that “[u]nder the Act’s three-year provision, an infringement is actionable within three years, and only three years, of its occurrence” and that “the infringer is insulated from liability for earlier infringements of the same work.” 572 U.S. at 671, 134 S.Ct. 1962. It stated that “§ 507(b)’s limitations period … allows plaintiffs … to gain retrospective relief running only three years back from the date the complaint was filed.” Id. at 672, 134 S.Ct. 1962. It also explicitly asserted that “a successful plaintiff can gain retrospective relief only three years back from the time of suit” and that “[n]o recovery may be had for infringement in earlier years.” Id. at 677, 134 S.Ct. 1962. Thus, damages “outside the three-year window” before Petrella filed suit could not be recovered. Id. Consequently, Petrella and Psihoyos counsel that. we must apply the discover rule to determine when a copyright infringement claim accrues, but a three-year lookback period from the time a suit is filed to determine the extent of the relief available.

Resisting this interpretation of Petrella, Sohm contends that the language from Petrella on which it relies was merely nonprecedential “dicta, taken out of context.” Sohm Reply Br. at 29. Not so. We are bound “not only [by] the result [of a Supreme Court opinion,] but also those portions of the opinion necessary to that result.” Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 67, 116 S.Ct. 1114, 134 L.Ed.2d 252 (1996). The Petrella Court partially based its determination that laches was inapplicable to actions under the Copyright Act on the conclusion that the statute “itself takes account of delay” by limiting damages to the three years prior to when suit is filed. Petrella, 572 U.S. at 677, 134 S.Ct. 1962. Therefore, the three-year limitation on damages was necessary to the result in Petrella and thus binding precedent.

Accordingly, under the Copyright Act, a plaintiff’s recovery is limited to damages incurred during the three years prior to filing suit. We reverse the district court’s contrary conclusion.

Scholastic finally argues that Sohm’s copyright infringement claims based on Corbis’s group copyright registrations, which did not include Sohm’s name as an author, are invalid. Citing to Muench, Scholastic asserts that Sohm’s name was required to be included in the group registrations for them to be valid under the Copyright Act, 712 F. Supp. 2d at 85, thereby rejecting the district court’s contrary conclusion here and the Ninth Circuit’s contrary conclusion in Alaska Stock. We, however, agree with the district court and the Ninth Circuit. The “author” that must be identified in a group registration under 17 U.S.C. § 409(2) is the author of the compilation, rather than the author of each underlying work, and a valid group registration works to register each individual work included in the compilation.

A certificate of copyright registration is a prerequisite to asserting a civil