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 similar conclusion, finding that print-run limitations in the context of a comparable PVA scheme “define the scope of the license; they are not simply covenants enforceable only through a breach of contract action.” 927 F. Supp. 2d at 998.

We conclude that the language is clear on the face of the license agreements: the print-run limitations were conditions precedent, the violation of which gave rise to claims for copyright infringement. Sohm thus properly pleaded copyright infringement. Accordingly, we reverse the grant of partial summary judgment to Scholastic on this basis.

Sohm next contends that the district court (1) misstated the elements of a claim for copyright infringement and (2) misallocated to Sohm the burden of proving that Scholastic’s use fell outside the scope of the license. He first maintains that the court’s version of the elements of a prima facie case – “(i) ownership of a valid copyright; and (ii) unauthorized copying of the copyrighted work,” Sohm, 2018 WL 1605214, at *2 – erroneously included the term “unauthorized.” Instead, Sohm urges that the proper formulation of the second element is “copying of constituent elements of the work that are original.” Sohm’s Br. at 40 (quoting Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 361, 111 S.Ct. 1282, 113 L.Ed.2d 358 (1991)).

He further asserts that the district court’s version of the elements of a copyright infringement case as applied in a license case, as opposed to a substantial similarity case, created an “impossible burden” in light of Scholastic’s claim that “it retained no records of its original licensing.” Id. at 41. According to Sohm, it was inappropriate to place on him the burden of showing that Scholastic’s use exceeded its license because there was “no legitimate scope of license issue” where Scholastic exceeded the print runs on the face of the invoices. Id. at 42. He argues that Scholastic “ha[d] the burden of coming forward with proof that it had a license for the uses at issue.” Id. at 43.

Sohm’s arguments on these points fail. The district court neither erroneously misstated the elements of a claim for copyright infringement nor improperly shifted the burden of proof to Sohm to demonstrate that Scholastic exceeded the scope of its license. We therefore affirm.

“In a copyright infringement case, the plaintiff must show: (i) ownership of a valid copyright; and (ii) unauthorized copying of the copyrighted work.” Jorgensen, 351 F.3d at 51. The existence of a license to engage in the challenged copying, however, is “an affirmative defense to a claim of copyright infringement … that the alleged infringer must plead and prove.” Yamashita v. Scholastic Inc., 936 F.3d 98, 104 (2d Cir. 2019); see also Bourne v. Walt Disney Co., 68 F.8d 621, 630–31 (2d Cir. 1995). Nevertheless, “when the contested issue is the scope of a license, rather than the existence of one, the copyright owner bears the burden of proving that the defendant’s copying was unauthorized under the license and the license need not be pleaded as an affirmative defense.” Graham, 144 F.3d at 236; see also Yamashita, 936 F.3d at 105 (“Applying these principles in the context of initial pleadings, when the existence of a license is not in question, a copyright holder must plausibly allege that the defendant exceeded the particular terms of the license.”).

Here, the district court’s recitation of the elements of a copyright infringement claim was correct in both form and