Page:Smith v. United States (2023).pdf/3

Rh generation, and this right undoubtedly inspired the Venue and Vicinage Clauses in the Constitution. Although the Clauses as adopted depart in some respects from the common law—most notably by providing new specifications about the place where a crime may be tried—there is no meaningful evidence to support Smith’s contention that the Constitution altered the remedy prescribed by common law for violations of the vicinage right.

(b) The Court rejects Smith’s argument that the Double Jeopardy Clause is implicated by retrial in a proper venue. A judicial decision on venue is fundamentally different from a jury’s general verdict of acquittal. When a jury returns a general verdict of not guilty, its decision “cannot be upset by speculation or inquiry into such matters” by courts. Dunn v. United States, 284 U. S. 390, 393–394. And because it is impossible for courts to be certain about the ground for the verdict without improperly delving into jury deliberations, the basis for the jury’s verdict cannot be a ground for setting aside an acquittal. General verdicts of acquittal are thus consistent with the general rule that “[c]ulpability … is the touchstone” for determining whether retrial is permitted under the Double Jeopardy Clause. Evans v. Michigan, 568 U. S. 313, 324. Under that rule, when a trial terminates with a finding that the defendant’s “criminal culpability had not been established,” retrial is prohibited. Burks v. United States, 437 U. S. 1, 10. Conversely, retrial is permissible when a trial terminates “on a basis unrelated to factual guilt or innocence of the offence of which [the defendant] is accused,” United States v. Scott, 437 U. S. 82, 99, e.g., juror deadlock, see Blueford v. Arkansas, 566 U. S. 599, 610. Similarly, the