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Rh (1977). And because it is impossible for a court to be certain about the ground for the verdict without improperly delving into the jurors’ deliberations, the jury holds an “ ‘unreviewable power … to return a verdict of not guilty’ ” even “ ‘for impermissible reasons.’ ” Powell, 469 U. S., at 63, 66–67; see Dunn, 284 U. S., at 393–394.

This rationale is consistent with the general rule that “[c]ulpability … is the touchstone” for determining whether retrial is permitted under the Double Jeopardy Clause. Evans v. Michigan, 568 U. S. 313, 324 (2013). When a trial terminates with a finding that the defendant’s “criminal culpability had not been established,” retrial is prohibited. Burks, 437 U. S., at 10. This typically occurs with “ ‘a resolution, correct or not, of some or all of the factual elements of the offense charged.’ ” Smith v. Massachusetts, 543 U. S. 462, 468 (2005); see, e.g., Martin Linen, 430 U. S., at 572. But it also extends to “essentially factual defense[s]” that negate culpability by “provid[ing] a legally adequate justification for otherwise criminal acts.” United States v. Scott, 437 U. S. 82, 97–98 (1978); see Burks, 437 U. S., at 5, 10 (insanity defense).

Conversely, retrial is permissible when a trial terminates “on a basis unrelated to factual guilt or innocence of the offence of which [the defendant] is accused.” Scott, 437 U. S., at 99. For example, the Double Jeopardy Clause is not triggered when a trial ends in juror deadlock, see Blueford v. Arkansas, 566 U. S. 599, 610 (2012), or with a judgment dismissing charges because of a procedural issue like preindictment delay, see Scott, 437 U. S., at 84. In these circumstances, the termination of proceedings is perfectly consistent with the possibility that the defendant is guilty of the charged offense.

The reversal of a conviction based on a violation of the Venue or Vicinage Clauses, even when styled as a “judgment of acquittal” under Rule 29, plainly does not resolve “the bottom-line question of ‘criminal culpability.’ ” Evans,