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12 “laid in an improper county” would not “bar … a subsequent indictment in the proper county.” 2 W. Hawkins, Pleas of the Crown 526 (6th ed. 1788). Hale and Blackstone reached similar conclusions. See 2 M. Hale, History of the Pleas of the Crown 245 (1736) (concluding that a second prosecution was available for indictments in different counties because courts “can only inquire touching a felony” in their own county); 4 Blackstone 368–369 (explaining that a defendant “may be indicted again” when a judgment of conviction is arrested for failure to adequately identify “the place” of the crime in the indictment); see also, e.g., Rex v. Huggins, 2 Ld. Raym. 1574, 1585, 92 Eng. Rep. 518, 525 (K. B. 1730) (approvingly citing the remedy in Arundel’s Case). In sum, no common-law principle at the founding precluded retrial following a trial in an improper venue or before an improper jury.

Early American practice provides further confirmation that violations of the Venue and Vicinage Clauses do not exempt defendants from retrial. Cf. Ramos, 590 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 6); District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U. S. 570, 605 (2008); Crawford v. Washington, 541 U. S. 36, 49–50 (2004). Perhaps most relevant here, this Court embraced the retrial rule for a venue error in United States v. Jackalow, 1 Black 484 (1862). In that case, the defendant had been convicted in New Jersey for a crime committed on a ship located off the coast of New York and Connecticut. Because the crime occurred outside of New Jersey, trial in that State was proper under the Venue and Vicinage Clauses only if the crime was committed outside the limits of any State. See. And because the jury’s special verdict on the issue of venue did not establish that fact, the Court directed the lower court “to set aside the special verdict, and grant a new trial.” Jackalow, 1 Black, at 488.

This decision did not break new ground. Decades earlier, Justice Story had concluded that “there are cases where