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6 York unless it somehow extended to the State. See, e.g., Travis v. United States, 364 U. S. 631, 634–637 (1961) (holding that prosecution was proper only in Washington, D. C., rather than in the defendant’s residence in Colorado); United States v. Lombardo, 241 U. S. 73, 76–78 (1916) (holding the same for a defendant who resided in Washington State). If avoiding hardship to a defendant were a “core purpos[e]” of the Venue Clause, Brief for Petitioner 18, such results would be inexplicable.

This disconnect between the State where trial would be least burdensome and the State where a crime was committed is exacerbated by the fact that many federal crimes occur in multiple States. We have held that a trial may be held “ ‘where any part’ ” of a crime “ ‘can be proved to have been done.’ ” United States v. Rodriguez-Moreno, 526 U. S. 275, 281 (1999) (quoting Lombardo, 241 U. S., at 77). As a result, the Venue Clause permits a defendant charged with conspiracy to be tried in any State in which any co-conspirator took any overt act in furtherance of the endeavor, Hyde v. United States, 225 U. S. 347, 365–367 (1912), and a defendant charged with illegally shipping goods may be tried in any State through which the goods were illegally transported, Armour Packing, 209 U. S., at 76–77. In these cases, as others, we have repeatedly rejected objections based on the “serious hardship in … prosecutions in places distant from the [defendant’s] home.” Id., at 77.

The Vicinage Clause provides no stronger textual support for petitioner’s argument. That Clause guarantees “the right to … an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed.” Amdt. 6. The coverage of this Clause “reinforce[s]” the coverage of the Venue Clause because, in protecting the right to a jury drawn from the place where a crime occurred, it functionally prescribes the place where a trial must be held. Rodriguez-Moreno, 526 U. S., at 278; Travis, 364 U. S., at