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Myth of a Scientific Method
“The unity of science, which is sometimes lost to view through immersion in specialist problems, is essentially a unity of method.” [Russell, 1938]

“But on one point I believe almost all modern historians of the natural sciences would agree. . .There is no such thing as the scientific method.” [Conant, 1947]

Our brief examination of the history of science suggests that trial and error have refined the following elements of modern, successful scientific method:

Facts are collected by carefully controlled experiments. Based on these facts, verifiable hypotheses are proposed, objectively tested by further experiments, and thereby proven or discarded.

This view of scientific method was universally embraced in the 19th century, and it is still popular. Most scientists would probably comment that this two-sentence description is necessarily a bit simplistic but is about right. They would replace the word ‘facts’, however, by ‘observations’, because they recognize that science is too dynamic for any data or ideas to be considered as immortal facts.

Philosophers of science universally reject this view of scientific method. They emphasize that objectivity is a myth, that experimental observations are inseparable from theories, and that hypothesis tests seldom cause rejection of a hypothesis and cannot prove a hypothesis. Furthermore, it is impossible to define a single scientific method shared by all scientists; the sciences and scientists are far too heterogeneous. Most philosophers of science conclude that the term ‘scientific method’ should be abandoned. “Scientists are people of very dissimilar temperaments doing different things in very different ways. Among scientists are collectors, classifiers, and compulsive tidiers-up; many are detectives by temperament and many are explorers; some are artists and others artisans.” [Medawer, 1967]

Both scientists and philosophers seek universal concepts, but scientists often settle for less: an idea may still be considered useful even if it does not fit all relevant data. We scientists can abandon the idea of ‘the scientific method’ but still embrace the concept of ‘scientific methods’ -- a suite of logical techniques, experimental techniques, principles, evaluation standards, and even ethical standards. Unlike Francis Bacon and Renè Descartes, modern scientists can select from this suite without rejecting the constructs of those who choose to use different methods. We must, however, know the limitations of both our methods and theirs.

Scientific Methods
Two of the most fundamental tools in the scientific toolbox are data and concepts. So basic is the distinction between the two, that nearly all publications confine data and interpretations to separate sections. Clearly, interpretations depend on data; less obviously, all data collection involves concept-based assumptions (Chapter 6).