Page:Six Major Prophets (1917).djvu/234

 What then is common to all sorts of Truth and Error, and renders them species of a common genus? Nothing but their psychological side; "truth" is the proper term for what satisfies, "error" for what thwarts, a human purpose in cognitive activity.

The difference between Truth and Error, therefore, is ultimately one in value. The "true" way of conceiving an object or judging a situation is simply the way most valuable for our purpose; the "false" way is one which is, at least relatively, worthless. "Truth" is a eulogistic, "error" a dyslogistic, way of valuing a cognitive situation.

Truth and Error therefore are continuous, as history shows. Either may develop out of the other, and both are rooted in the same problems of knowing, which are ultimately problems of living. The "truths" of one generation become the "errors" of the next, when it has achieved more valuable and efficient modes of interpreting and manipulating the apparent "facts", which the new "truths" are continuously transforming. And conversely, what is now scouted as "error" may hereafter become the fruitful parent of a long progeny of "truths."

It follows also that (as every examiner who marks a paper knows) Truth and Error admit of quantitative differences. Both can vary in importance, and can attain (or fail of) their purpose to a greater or a less degree. But neither is absolute. An answer to a question is in general called true, if it is true enough for the purpose in hand. But this does not preclude a greater exactitude if (for a different purpose) it should be required. It is a true answer to the question—"when do you leave?" to reply "to-morrow"; but if necessary I can specify the train I go by. Thus the demand for absolute