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Rh  other question of proximate causation, the question whether an act or condition is an intervening or concurrent cause is usually a question for the jury. Helena Gas Co. v. Rogers, 104 Ark. 59, 147 S.W. 473. ''See also, Rhoads v. Service Mach. Co.,'' 329 F.Supp. 367 (E. D. Ark. 1971).

[3] The rule of nonliability predicated on the "proximate cause" of injuries being the consumption, not the sale of intoxicants, is not persuasive. Implicit in the common-law rule is that proximate cause must be the immediate cause. This is contrary to our cases interpreting proximate cause. This Court has held that proximate cause is the efficient and responsible cause, but it need not be the last or nearest one. Bennett v. Bell, 176 Ark. 690, 3 S.W.2d 996 (1928). The mere fact that other causes intervene between the original act of negligence and the injury for which recovery is sought is not sufficient to relieve the original actor of liability, if the injury is the natural and probable consequence of the original negligent act or omission and is such as might reasonably have been foreseen as probable. Butler v. Arkansas Power & Light Co., 186 Ark. 611, 54 S.W.2d 984; ''Arkansas Power & Light Co. v. Marsh, supra; Hayes v. Missouri Pac. R.R. Co.,'' 208 Ark. 370, 186 S.W.2d 780 (1945). The original act or omission is not eliminated as a proximate cause by an intervening cause unless the latter is of itself sufficient to stand as the cause of the injury. Butler v. Arkansas Power & Light Co., supra; Arkansas Power & Light Co. v. Marsh, supra. The intervening cause must be such that the injury would not have been suffered except for the act, conduct, or effect of the intervening agent totally independent of the acts or omission constituting the primary negligence. ''Arkansas Power & Light Co. v. Marsh, supra; Hayes v. Missouri Pac. R.R. Co., supra.''

[4] We find no basis for determining that the proximate cause is solely the voluntary consumption of alcohol. Under our theory of proximate cause, the selling of alcohol may be a proximate cause of injuries along with the proximate cause of the consumption. The two are not mutually exclusive. In order to relieve liability as a matter of law, we have to accept that a minor's intoxication is not reasonably foreseeable and merely possible, but not within the range of probability as viewed by the ordinary man. ''Hayes v. Missouri Pac. R.R. Co., supra.'' We believe that selling