Page:Seventh Report - Guns for gold- the Wagner Network exposed.pdf/56

Rh ''we have medium-confidence of attempts at Wagner involvement. This intelligence should make use of network-mapping capabilities. A cross-Government taskforce would be particularly useful as the Wagner Network transforms, following the attempted march on Moscow.'' (Paragraph 54)

14. The UK’s efforts to sanction the Wagner Network are underwhelming in the extreme, compared to those of the European Union and the United States. The responses from the Minister leave us with limited confidence that the UK coordinates effectively with its allies to share intelligence on the Wagner Network and to impose sanctions on relevant individuals and entities. Equally, the Government left us with very little confidence that those British nationals pursued by the Wagner Network receive any meaningful support from the British Government; indeed, they were made more vulnerable due to decisions made from within Government. (Paragraph 55)

15. The Government claimed that its sanctioning of the ‘Wagner Group’ automatically covered all the entities that the Group owns or controls. This approach under-appreciates the complexity of the network. It is also completely unrealistic. It leaves both enforcement agencies and implementing organisations, such as banks, estate agents and other financial services, with no idea which affiliated entities they should target. This makes it possible, if not probable, that Wagner-linked entities are continuing to benefit from access to the UK’s financial markets. The lack of certainty about this denotes a scandalous failure to exercise due diligence. At its worst, this could mean the UK is inadvertently undermining the efforts of our allies. (Paragraph 56)

16. The Minister had no specific knowledge of work within his Department to analyse whether Wagner activities undermine the financial impact of UK sanctions on the Russian war machine. Despite finding it “likely”, he could not confirm that the FCDO had had any input to HM Treasury’s unwise decision to issue sanctions waivers to Prigozhin. Despite assuring us that the Treasury and FCDO communicate over sanctions waivers in general, the Minister himself had not received any official advice specifically on sanctions waivers. Given his position as the Parliamentary Under Secretary of State for Europe, we would expect him to have an interest and role in questions relating to sanctions waivers linked to Russia and Ukraine. His statements also lead us to question whether the Russia Unit is providing the necessary join-up between the FCDO and Treasury, given the central role of sanctions as a tool of UK foreign policy. (Paragraph 57)

17. ''We recommend that the Government move faster and harder in sanctioning Wagner-linked individuals and entities. Specifically, it should:'' (Paragraph 58)


 * (a) Sanction all individuals and entities provided in Appendix 1, which the United States and European Union have already targeted but which the UK has not;


 * (b) Consider bringing forth sanctions on civilian enablers and corporate ‘ frontmen’ for the network’s activities; and


 * (c) Close enforcement gaps.