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Rh The details of this new approach are not yet clear. Some aspects of the UK response are unlikely to be public, for example, activity to counter malign Russian disinformation.

35. Given that Ukraine is “front and centre”, we asked the Department at what point the network’s activities in other countries should become a point of interest for the UK Government, given the negative effects of its presence and the likely use of resources from African operations to fund Russia’s renewed illegal invasion of Ukraine. The FCDO did not directly answer. Instead, it re-emphasised the use of sanctions and noted:

"We are stepping up what we are doing inside Government on this. We have, frankly, much more activity inside Government aimed at understanding Wagner and trying to take steps against it than we did six months ago."

36. Mikhail Khodorkovsky—a Russian dissident, former senior businessman, and the founder of the Dossier Center—suggested that the UK and its allies under-estimated the significance of the network’s activities in Africa. In some cases, it is not clear that the disruptive and destabilising influence of the Wagner Network has informed important decisions over the UK’s policy towards specific countries and regions:

• In March 2021, wider aid cuts led to the premature ending of a £2.6 million UK-funded programme designed to foster stability in Sudan, a country where the Wagner Network had been involved since 2017. We disagree with the Foreign Secretary that there is no connection between ODA expenditure and the conflict in Sudan.202

• In late 2022, the UK, along with many other countries, announced that it would withdraw its peacekeeping forces from Mali, ending involvement earlier than expected. Wagner involvement appears to have contributed to this decision. It is not clear what efforts the UK made to encourage the Malian authorities to allow the UN Mission to operate freely. The decision to withdraw was taken collectively via the National Security Council, via a “write-round process initiated by the Defence Secretary”. We do not know whether FCDO officials raised alternatives to withdrawal for discussion with the Ministry of Defence.