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14. As shown by the above examples, the Wagner Network’s activities have gone beyond conventional military activities. Its services encompassed political advisory services, electoral services, media campaigns, mineral extraction and guarding/security services. It has also run “opportunistic” Russian disinformation campaigns via Prigozhin-affiliated media outlets, which can serve as a precursor to the involvement of Wagner fighters— as occurred in Mali (see Table 2 above). Mark Galeotti, Honorary Professor at the UCL School of Slavonic and East European Studies, has noted the network:

"…shifts almost seamlessly between being an out and out proxy of the Kremlin, and an essentially commercial organisation driven by the search for profit. This not only makes it often difficult to grasp its motivations in any one theatre, it also highlights the challenges of dealing with regimes in which the boundaries between the private and the public are both porous and mobile."

He asserted that “while clearly Prigozhin would not deploy it […] without getting clearance from the Kremlin, in most cases it is [not] actively tasked by the Russian government”. He cited Ukraine and Libya as exceptions, where “Wagner is clearly and verifiably acting on Kremlin orders”. However, even in countries where the network operates solely for economic gain and receives payments from host governments (rather than the Russian state):

"…clearly Moscow does accrue some influence and soft power [from the Network’s presence], especially by being demonstrably willing to work with corrupt and authoritarian governments […] Prigozhin’s contractors – not just mercenaries but also political technologists – can be a useful foot in the door. […] Wagner can act as a cover for intelligence and influence operations conducted by the SVR (Foreign Intelligence Service) and, especially, GRU (military intelligence)."