Page:Senate Report No. 94-465 (1975).pdf/213

199 tank rockets. This further request was also passed on to CIA Headquarters. (Cable, Station to HQ, 3/15/61) There is no evidence that any of these arms were supplied to the dissidents.

The documentary record makes clear that the Special Assistant at the State Department was also advised of related developments in a March 16, 1961, "picnic" letter from Dearborn who complained that his spirits were in the doldrums because:


 * * * the members of our club are now prepared in their minds to have a picnic but do not have the ingredients for the salad. Lately they have developed a plan for the picnic, which just might work if they could find the proper food. They have asked us for a few sandwiches, hardly more, and we are not prepared to make them available. Last week we were asked to furnish three or four pineapples for a party in the near future, but I could remember notbing in my instructions that would have allowed me to contribute this ingredient. Don't think I wasn't tempted. I have rather specific guidelines to the effect that salad ingredients will be delivered outside the picnic grounds and will be brought to the area by another club. (Letter, Dearborn to Special Assistant, 3/16/16)

After reviewing his "picnic" letter, together with the requests in the March 14 and 15 cables discussed above, Dearborn concluded during his testimony before the Committee that the "pineapples" were probably the requested fragmentation grenades and the restriction on delivering salad ingredients outside of the picnic grounds was, almost certainly, meant to refer to the requirement, of the January 12 Special Group decision that arms be delivered outside the Dominican Republic. (Dearborn, 7/29/75, pp. 25-27)

(ii) The Passage of Pistols (1) Pouching to the DominicanRepublic In a March 15, 1961 cable, a Station officer reported that Dearborn had asked for three .38 caliber pistols for issue to several dissidents. In reply, Headquarters cabled: "Regret no authorization exists to suspend pouch regulations against shipment of arms," and indicated that their reply had been coordinated with State. (Cable, HQ to Station, 3/17/61) The Station officer then asked Headquarters to seek the necessary authorization and noted that at his last two posts he had received pistols via the pouch for "worthy purposes" and, therefore, he knew it could be done. (Cable, Station to HQ, 3/21/61) Two days later, Headquarters cabled that the pistols and ammunition were being pouched. However, the Station was instructed not to advise Dearborn. (Cable, HQ to Station, 3/24/61).

(2) Reason for the CIA instructionnot to tell Dearborn A Station officer testified that he believed the "don't tell Dearborn the pistol is being pouched" language simply meant that the sending of firearms through the diplomatic pouch was not something to be unnecessarily discussed. (Didier, 7/8/75, pp. 78, 79) Dearborn said he never doubted the pouch was used, since he knew the Station had no other means of receiving weapons. (Dearborn, 7/20/75, p. 33) "There is no indication in the EM/DEED operational files that the pistols were actually pouched. The request for pistols appears to have been overtaken by a subsequent request for submachine guns." (IG. Report, p. 60) This conclusion is difficult to understand in light of the March 24, 1961, Headquarters to Station cable, which provides: "Pouching revolvers and ammo requested TRUJ 0462 (in 20040) on 28 March. Do not advise (name Dearborn deleted) this material being pouched. Explanation follows."

' The Inspector General's Report, issued in connection with a review of these events, concludes that: