Page:Select Essays in Anglo-American Legal History, Volume 1.djvu/847

 ^0. VEEDER: A CENTURY OF JUDICATURE 833 conduct of the respondent. How is the word ' impossible * to be interpreted in the proposition thus stated? ... If it be extended to what is sometimes called ' moral ' impossibil- ity, a proposition could scarcely be conceived more elastic. It would afford no sort of guide, but would, in my opinion, unsettle the law and throw it into hopeless confusion. Views as to what is possible in this sense would differ most widely. . . . Not a few would think that the discharge of the duties of married life was impossible whenever love had been re- placed by hatred, when insulting and galling language was constantly used, when, in short, the ordinary marital rela- tion no longer prevailed. One opinion may be held by many that it would be well that in all such cases a judicial separa- tion should be granted — that relief should always be given where the prospect of happiness so long as the parties co- habited appeared hopeless. But these are considerations for the legislature, not for the courts. . . . Our duty, on the present occasion, is to administer, not to make the law. I have no inclination towards a blind adherence to precedents. I am conscious that the law must be moulded by adapting it on established principles to the changing conditions which social development involves. But marital misconduct is, un- fortunately, as old as matrimony itself. Great as have been the social changes which have characterized the last century, in this respect there has been no alteration, no new develop- ment. I think it is impossible to do otherwise than proceed upon the old lines." While he believed that the amendment of the law should be left to the legislature, he was not unmindful of the hard- ship often occasioned by the application of established rules. But he held that " in laying down a proposition of law it is necessary to keep in view the consequences, and not to con- template its operation in the particular case." Therefore, in holding, in Derry v. Peek, 14 A. C. 376, that an untrue statement made negligently, but with an honest belief in its truth, would not sustain an action for deceit, he said : " I have arrived, with some reluctance, at the conclusion to which I have felt myself compelled, for I think that those who put before the public a prospectus to induce them to embark