Page:Select Essays in Anglo-American Legal History, Volume 1.djvu/808

 794 V. BENCH AND BAR — but a case of imbecility approaching to idiocy, or amount- ing to unsoundness of mind. In a case of insanity accom- panied by delusions, the mode of investigating it, so as to arrive at the truth, is a matter of great difficulty and doubt ; but in a case of imbecility, where there is either no mind at all or next to none, the task of coming to a right or just decision is comparatively easy. It is impossible for a man who is said to have only a limited amount of mind, or none at all, to assume at any moment or for any purpose a greater amount of mind than he really possesses. If the mind is not there, or only there in a certain small and limited quan- tity, no desire on the part of the individual to show a greater amount of mind, or to assume the appearance of a greater amount of mind, can supply him with that which nature has denied him. Hence when a man is charged with imbecility, if it can be shown that for a considerable time and in vari- ous situations he has acted like a natural being, any acts of folly which might be alleged against him should be carefully, deliberately and keenly investigated, because at first sight it is next to impossible that a man can at certain times as- sume a mind and intelligence which are wholly absent." Although a scholar of the highest attainments. Cairns* opinions are never academic. The frugality of his style is in marked contrast to the fertility of thought. Of words or illustrations or expository digressions, he is sparing to a fault ; he never relaxes the tension of the argument. These characteristics point toward the most conspicuous quality of his work — lucidity. The most complex legal problem seemed to present no difficulty to his mind. He disembarrassed himself of details and grasped principles, and by strict logical deduction from general principles about which there could be no dispute, he not only settled the law, but also terminated discussion.^ He had, moreover — and this was his crowning gift — that cultured imagination which is essential to the highest juridical art. Imagination, after all, is, for the most part, simply depth and breadth drts, 1 App. Cas. 488, with Chief Justice Cockburn's judgment in the lower court (10 Ex. 337) will illustrate his habit of seeking ultimate principles.
 * A comparison between his solution of the case of Goodwin v. Rob-