Page:Select Essays in Anglo-American Legal History, Volume 1.djvu/780

 766 V. BENCH AND BAR in the court of final appeal were for the first time adequately administered by the master minds of Westbury and Cairns. This period has been aptly termed by Sir Frederick Pollock the classical period of English law. (a) Common Law Courts The central figure in the Court of Queen's Bench through- out this period was Blackburn. But he was ably assisted, and in some respects supplemented, by the chief justice of the court, Sir Alexander Cockburn (1859-80). The large meastire of public attention which Sir Alexander Cockburn commanded during his lifetime probably led to an undue estimate of the permanent value of his judicial services. Along with gifts which readily attract public admiration, he had an eye for effect little short of dramatic ; and his dis- tinguished manner was calculated to impress the senses even when his judgment failed to satisfy the understanding. Still, even a cursory examination of his work reveals singular ability. Combining in an eminent degree logical and imag- inative qualities of mind, he was not only a consummate ad- vocate, but also a distinguished judge. Possibly there have been more eminent advocates ; certainly there have been more profound j udges ; but rarely a man who united to such an extent the attributes of each. Like Erskine and Brougham, with whom alone he shares the highest honors of forensic advocacy at the English bar, his mind was more capacious than powerful, clear rather than profound. In judgment he surpassed both, and the acute sensibility which was his most prominent characteristic, manifested itself in a range of imagination to which neither of his great rivals could make any pretension. Indeed, such was the range of his imagination that, had it been balanced by equal strength in reasoning faculty, his mental equipment would have been unsurpassed. But the acute sensibility that characterized his temperament was Itself of no inconsiderable aid in the successful discharge of his judicial functions. The law is not merely a system of rules, nor is its administration simply the application of these rules by rigid logical deduction.