Page:Select Essays in Anglo-American Legal History, Volume 1.djvu/779

 £0. V ELDER: A CENTURY OF JUDICATURE 765 agitation against the anomalies and abuses of the prevailing legal system culminated about that time in a series of practi- cal reforms which brought the administration of justice into something like accord with the world of affairs. From this time forward the law ceased to appear to be designed as a restraint upon human activity. First and foremost was the Common Law Procedure Act of 1852. This great measure and its immediate successors largely transformed the ancient procedure. Causes of action by and against the same parties were permitted to be joined, and several equitable defences were allowed. Special demurrers were abolished, together with much of the ancient verbiage, and only such statements as must be proved were essential in pleading. In 1851 that final absurdity in the law of evidence which closed the mouth of the very person who knew most about the matter in dispute was abolished, and the testimony of interested witnesses be- came simply a matter of credibility. In equity a series of practical reforms removed many of the most obvious defects of procedure ; additional vice-chancellors were appointed in 1851 to cope with the burden of arrears, and, above all, in the same year, a permanent court of appeal in chancery was established. The confusion and absurdities of the ecclesias- tical administration of probate and matrimonial affairs were finally removed in 1858 by the creation of an independent court for probate and matrimonial causes. The demand for the infusion of new blood into the court of final appeal was also recognized. The Court of Crown Cases Reserved, where points of criminal law could be reviewed, dates from 1848. But institutions are of little utility unless they are ad- ministered by men who are in sympathy with their purpose and spirit. From this point of view the middle of the century is of even greater significance as a turning point in legal history, for it marks the advent of Willes, Bramwell and Blackburn in common law, and of Knight-Bruce, Turner and Page-Wood in equity. Under the guidance of such minds, in which technical learning and common sense were combined in large measure, the law ceased to act as a sort of surprise upon mankind, and the realization of rights became prac- ticable. A few years later the larger interests of the law