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 18. BRYCE: THE EXTENSION OF LAW 609 passed during his term of office as Legal Member of Council, and was also the author of the Evidence Act, was a man of great industry, much intellectual force, and warm zeal for codification. But his capacity for the work of drafting was deemed not equal to his fondness for it. He did not shine either in fineness of discrimination or in delicacy of expression. Indian critics, besides noting these facts, went on to observe that in country places four-fifths of the pro- visions of the Contract Act were superfluous, while those which were operative sometimes unduly fettered the discre- tion of the magistrate or judge, entangling him in tech- nicalities, and preventing him from meting out that sub- stantial justice which is what the rural suitor needs. The judge cannot disregard the Act, because if the case is ap- pealed, the Court above, which has only the notes of the evidence before it, and does not hear the witnesses, is bound to enforce the provisions of the law. In a country like India, law ought not to be too rigid: nor ought rights to be stiffened up so strictly as they are by this Contract Act. Creditors had already, through the iron regularity with which the British Courts enforce judgements by execution, obtained far more power over debtors than they possessed in the old days, and more than the benevolence of the English administrator approves. The Cdhtract Act increases this power still further. This particular criticism does not re- flect upon the technical merits of the Act in itself. But it does suggest reasons, which would not occur to a European mind, why it may be inexpedient by making the law too precise to narrow the path In which the judge has to walk. A stringent administration of the letter of the law Is In semi-civilized communities no unmixed blessing. So much for the rural districts. In the Presidency cities, on the other hand, the Contract Code Is by most experts pro- nounced to be unnecessary. The judges and the bar are al- ready familiar with the points which It covers, and find them- selves — so at least many of them say — rather embarrassed than aided by it. They think It cramps their freedom of handling a point in argument. They prefer the elasticity of the common law. And in point of fact, they seem to make