Page:Select Essays in Anglo-American Legal History, Volume 1.djvu/417

 11. REINSCH: COLONIAL COMMON LAW 403 reasonable customs of England, as used and practiced within the province." ^ However, the power of the courts to apply any English law, customary or statutory, which they found suitable to American conditions was no longer disputed. The opposition to lawyers common in the colonies we also find in Maryland. ^ The great influence which the theory of the adoption of the common law gave to the courts was recog- nized in a resolve in 1684, which stated " that it left too much to discretion and is an open gap to corruption." ^ At this time, however, the lord proprietor insisted that if the English laws were to be used the governor and chief justice must be allowed to decide when they ought to be applied. Only on this basis would he consent to a re-enactment of the judicature act.* The attitude of the people toward the proprietor is further illustrated by the fact that an appeal to the king in legal proceedings was asked for. ^ Although, even in the earlier practice of Maryland, the terms of English law were used, its principles were often entirely neglected, and matters settled according to a rough equity.^ Thus, in a case of homicide, the jury brought in a verdict finding accidental killing and no negligence; the court, however, fined the person who had handled the weapon that caused the accident. ^ In another criminal proceeding the accused is arraigned and pleads guilty before the grand jury passes on the indictment and finds it billa vera.^ m. THE SOUTHEEN COLONIES Virginia The prevailing belief that codes of law are necessary for new colonies is evidenced by Crashaw's sermon preached before the London Company in February, 1609-10. Crashaw • McMahon's History of Maryland, p. 127. • Proceedings of Assembly, II, 168. • Maryland Archives, Proceedings of Assembly, 1684-1692, p. 7L • Maryland Archives, Lower House Journal, 1676-1702, q. 107. • Maryland Archives, Proceedings of Council, II, 140. • Maryland Archives, Provincial Court. • This recalls the early principle that the possessor or even the owner of the weapon by which the injury was caused is responsible. • Ibid., p. 183.