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 Because the TMSS serves the function of regulating access to the Genesis III, and because a means of access to the Genesis III console without using the TMSS initialization code is not known to manufacturers of competing video game cartridges, there is an insufficient basis for a finding of nonfunctionality. Moreover, we note that the only evidence in the record (other than the Nagashima declaration) relating to Accolade’s ability to gain access to the Genesis III through the use of any process other than the TMSS is the affidavit of Alan Miller. Miller stated that Accolade’s software engineers—who, absent any evidence to the contrary, we presume to be reasonably competent representatives of their profession—have not been able to discover such a method. This evidence supports our conclusion that Sega has not met its burden of establishing nonfunctionality.

Sega argues that it is not required to share with Accolade or with any other competitor the secrets of how the TMSS works, and how to engineer around it. Sega is correct—the law does not require that it disclose its trade secrets to Accolade in connection with its effort to prevail on its Lanham Act claim, nor in connection with its effort to defend itself against Accolade’s counterclaim. Nevertheless, a Lanham Act plaintiff is not entitled to prevail in litigation solely on the basis of unsupported assertions. Rather, it has a choice. It can take its chances and proceed to trial without the sensitive evidence. Alternatively, if it believes the evidence important to the resolution of the dispute, it may seek a protective order from the court pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(c)(7) governing discovery. “The protective order is not a substitute for [evidence relevant to the merits]. Its purpose … is to prevent harm by limiting disclosure of relevant and necessary information.” Micro Motion, Inc. v. Kane Steel Co., Inc., 894 F.2d 1318, 1325 (Fed.Cir.1990) (emphasis omitted). Upon a showing that a protective order is warranted, see American Standard, Inc. v. Pfizer Inc., 828 F.2d 734, 739–44 (Fed.Cir.1987), the court may restrict access to the disputed material to the opposing party’s counsel, or may allow the parties to retain independent experts to evaluate material that is subject to the protective order. See, e.g., Safe Flight Instrument Corp. v. Sundstrand Data Control, Inc., 682 F.Supp. 20, 22 (D.Del.1988) (listing cases). The latter solution is particularly helpful to the court in a case such as this one, in which the dispute is highly technical in nature. However, neither the district court nor Sega took advantage of this procedure. Thus there is no independent evidence to support the conclusion offered by Nagashima.

In summary, because Sega did not produce sufficient evidence regarding the existence of a feasible alternative to the use of the TMSS initialization code, it did not carry its burden and its claim of nonfunctionality fails. Possibly, Sega will be able to meet its burden of proof at trial. We cannot say. However, we conclude that in light of the record before the district court, Sega was not entitled to preliminary injunctive relief under the Lanham Act.

Finally, we decline to order the district court to grant Accolade preliminary injunctive relief on its Lanham Act claim. If requested, the district court may reconsider that issue in light of the legal principles we