Page:Scott Nearing - The Germs of War (1916).djvu/15

 Military men reason thus within themselves, "Why have officers if there is to be no war?" And, by the same token, if there are officers, why not have war? Any man trained for a profession, and then held continually away from it, would reason in exactly the same way. The military establishment is as likely to lead a nation toward war as guns and dogs are likely to lead a household toward hunting.

Still, the army is a relatively small factor in American life. There are less than twenty thousand military and naval officers in the United States. Their business is war, but they are the merest handful as compared with the whole country. If there were two or three hundred thousand officers in the United States they might constitute a serious menace to the peace of the country, as they do in those European countries that have a great militarist caste.

Secret diplomacy is a fruitful cause of misunderstanding among nations. The statesmen write notes for weeks or perhaps for years; the tension between the countries grows greater; intrigue breeds rumor; people are white hot with expectancy, fear, and uncertainty. Then a pin drops somewhere, and the nations are mobolizing.

If the records of the correspondence between the warring nations of Europe had been published before the war began instead of after it started, there might have been no war. The negotiations between nations should be as open as the sessions of the legislatures or the courts. Daylight diplomacy would eliminate much bad feeling between the nations.

There are politicians who would make war to get votes. Such men are undoubtedly in a hopeless minority, yet the type exists, and in a grave crisis it must be reckoned with.

Still this is not the answer. None of these things will explain the causes of great wars, like the present struggle in Europe. None of them will explain the campaign for national preparedness called on so effectively