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 only, as to require the mention of no other definite eternal objects in the capacity of relata. Of course, the relationship R(A, B, C) may involve subordinate relationships which are themselves eternal objects, and R(A, B, C) is also itself an eternal object. Also there will be other relationships which in the same sense involve only A, B, C. We have now to examine how, having regard to the internal relatedness of eternal objects, this limited relationship R(A, B, C) is possible.

The reason for the existence of finite relationships in the realm of eternal objects is that relationships of these objects among themselves are entirely unselective, and are systematically complete. We are discussing possibility; so that every relationship which is possible is thereby in the realm of possibility. Every such relationship of each eternal object is founded upon the perfectly definite status of that object as a relatum in the general scheme of relationships. This definite status is what I have termed the ‘relational essence’ of the object. This relational essence is determinable by reference to that object alone, and does not require reference to any other objects, except those which are specifically involved in its individual essence when that essence is complex (as will be explained immediately). The meaning of the words ‘any’ and ‘some’ springs from this principle — that is to say, the meaning of the ‘variable’ in logic. The whole principle is that a particular determination can be made of the how of some definite relationship of a definite eternal object A to a definite finite number n of other eternal objects, without any determination of the other n objects, X1, X2,. . . Xn, except that they