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xviii the mental workshop of a Fresnel, a Kelvin, or a Helmholtz, that profound ideas of the deep things of Nature are struck out and assume form; when pondered over and paraphrased by philosophers we see them react on the conduct of life: it is the business of criticism to polish them gradually to the common measure of human understanding. Oppressed though we are with the necessity of being specialists, if we are to know anything thoroughly in these days of accumulated details, we may at any rate profitably study the historical evolution of knowledge over a field wider than our own.

The aspect of the subject which has here been dwelt on is that scientific progress, considered historically, is not a strictly logical process, and does not proceed by syllogisms. New ideas emerge dimly into intuition, come into consciousness from nobody knows where, and become the material on which the mind operates, forging them gradually into consistent doctrine, which can be welded on to existing domains of knowledge. But this process is never complete: a crude connection can always be pointed to by a logician as an indication of the imperfection of human constructions.

If intuition plays a part which is so important,