Page:Schnarr v. State, 2018 Ark. 333.pdf/4

 words their ordinary and usually accepted meaning in common language." Hinton v. State, 2015 Ark. 479, at 7–8, 477 S.W.3d 517, 521 (internal citations omitted). Further, we construe the statute so that no word is left void, superfluous or insignificant, and we give meaning and effect to every word in the statute, if possible. Brown v. Kelton, 2011 Ark. 93, at 3, 380 S.W.3d 361, 364 (internal citations omitted). Finally, "it is a fundamental canon of construction that when interpreting or construing a statute the court may consider the text as a whole to derive its meaning or purpose. Dolan v. U.S. Postal Serv., 546 U.S. 481, 486 (2006); Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts 167 (2012)." Wilson v. Walther, 2017 Ark. 270, at 16, 527 S.W.3d 709, 718.

With these standards in mind, we turn to Schnarr's first point on appeal. Schnarr contends that the circuit court erred when it did not allow him to argue that he believed he was acting in self-defense and did not instruct the jury on justification. Schnarr urges us to revisit our interpretation of section 5-2-614. The State responds that the law-of-the-case doctrine bars review of this claim. The State further responds that "a plain language reading of this statute, as a whole, states that when a defendant is charged with manslaughter, an offense involving a reckless mens rea, he is precluded from arguing the defense of justification."

The law-of-the-case doctrine "prohibits a court from reconsidering issues of law or fact that have already been decided on appeal. The doctrine provides that a decision of an appellate court establishes the law of the case for trial upon remand and for the appellate court itself upon subsequent review. The doctrine serves to effectuate efficiency and finality in the