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Rh that this statutory provision lacks the clear statement necessary to qualify as jurisdictional.

First, §1252(d)(1) imposes an exhaustion requirement, which is a quintessential claim-processing rule. When faced with a type of statutory requirement that “ordinarily [is] not jurisdictional,” we naturally expect the ordinary case, not an “exceptional one.” Sebelius v. Auburn Regional Medical Center, 568 U. S. 145, 154–155 (2013); see also, e.g., United States v. Kwai Fun Wong, 575 U. S. 402, 410 (2015). So it is here. We routinely “trea[t] as nonjurisdictional … threshold requirements that claimants must complete, or exhaust, before filing a lawsuit.” Reed Elsevier, Inc. v. Muchnick, 559 U. S. 154, 166, and n. 6 (2010). Indeed, we have yet to hold that any statutory exhaustion requirement is jurisdictional when applying the clear-statement rule that we adopted in Arbaugh.

Exhaustion is typically nonjurisdictional for good reason. Jurisdictional treatment of an exhaustion requirement could undo the benefits of exhaustion. That is, exhaustion promotes efficiency, including by encouraging parties to resolve their disputes without litigation. See Jones v. Bock, 549 U. S. 199, 219 (2007); McCarthy v. Madigan, 503 U. S. 140, 145 (1992). But jurisdictional treatment can result in