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16 Finally, not only do the Government’s theories fail on their own terms, but they also share a common problem: They would render the statutory scheme incoherent. The Government urges that reconsideration (or at least a motion to reconsider) is an “administrative remed[y] available … as of right,” §1252(d)(1). Yet §1252(d)(1) requires “exhaus[ting] all” such remedies, without exception. So if the Government is correct, noncitizens would need to seek reconsideration from the Board before obtaining judicial review in every case. But that obligation is incompatible with the rest of the statute’s design.

In particular, elsewhere, the statute provides for a process that does not require reconsideration before judicial review. Noncitizens are authorized to seek judicial review of an agency order and, additionally, to seek administrative review of the agency’s decision via a “motion to reopen or reconsider the order.” See §1252(b)(6). The statute gives noncitizens the same 30-day window from the agency order to seek judicial review and administrative reconsideration. §§1252(b)(1), 1229a(c)(6)(B). The statute is thus designed around pursuing judicial review and agency reconsideration in parallel, not waiting to seek judicial review until after reconsideration is complete. With respect to a prior version of this scheme, we observed that, if a noncitizen seeks reconsideration, the statute plainly “contemplates” that “two separate petitions for [judicial] review will exist in the normal course”: one from the agency’s initial order and a later one from its decision on the reconsideration motion. Stone, 514 U. S., at 393–395.

If reconsideration were required for exhaustion, however, only one petition—the later one—would pass muster. The first petition would be premature. So the Government’s interpretation of remedies “available … as of right” would not just flood the Board with reconsideration motions that noncitizens otherwise would not file; it would also flood the courts with pointless premature petitions—petitions that